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The South African Law Commission has proposed a number of substantive and 
procedural reforms to South Africa’s laws governing sexual offences. This article 
argues that, while important in principle, these reforms are unlikely to shift police 
and prosecution practices or to meaningfully increase the numbers of offences 
prosecuted or perpetrators convicted. Support for this argument is drawn from the 
experiences of other Anglo-American jurisdictions in implementing similar reforms. 
The current law reform process does, however, present an important opportunity 
to consider possible reforms that have the potential to shift institutional norms 
informing current criminal justice practice, and to provide meaningful protection 
for victims of sexual offences forced to navigate that system. One such reform, 
which has met with some success in other jurisdictions, is the introduction of 
a legal representative to engage with the criminal justice process on behalf of 
the victim. This article looks at the legal and constitutional rationale for such an 
innovation and at models used in comparative jurisdictions, concluding that such 
a reform would go a long way towards ensuring that the existing rights of rape 
victims are meaningfully enforced.
Introduction
The alarmingly high prevalence of sexual offences in South Africa and the 
particularly brutal nature of these attacks stand in glaring contrast to the 
South African government’s stated commitment to addressing violence 
against women in this country. On the one hand, South Africa’s Constitution 
enshrines the right to gender equality1 and is unique in containing a 
right to freedom from all forms of violence, whether public or private in 
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origin.2 Over the ten years since apartheid offi cially ended South Africa 
has passed progressive domestic violence legislation,3 the State President 
has designated violence against women and children a priority area for 
state efforts to combat crime, and Parliament is currently considering a bill 
which will substantially reform the South African laws on sexual offences.4
On the other hand, South Africa has one of the highest rates of reported 
rape in the world,5 with a substantial number of rapes going unreported. 
South African commentators liken the nature of sexual assaults in this 
country to those perpetrated during armed confl ict, in terms of the types 
of degradation and the extent of injuries involved.6 Studies suggest that 
a third to half of all rapes occurring in South Africa are perpetrated by 
more than one offender,7 with the number of rape homicides estimated 
to be twelve times higher than in the United States.8 For every 100 rape 
cases reported in South Africa, only some 15 are prosecuted, with fewer 
than half of those resulting in a guilty verdict.9 Given this context, it is 
imperative that the South African government acts decisively to address 
this pressing problem. This article contends that the proposed reforms 
to South Africa’s rape laws will not provide us with such a radical 
intervention. This is not least because, although symbolically important, 
many of the proposed reforms have proved to be relatively ineffectual 
in shifting criminal justice attitudes and practices in the countries from 
which South Africa has borrowed them, and in which they have been 
implemented over the past 30 or so years. This article argues therefore 
that the South African government should take the opportunity during 
2
    Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution.
3    Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998.
4     Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill [B50-2003].
5     L Artz and K Kunisaki ‘Rape during armed confl ict and refl ections on the “uncivil war” on 
women in South Africa’ in S Abdullah et al (eds) Why is there So Much Violence against 
Women in Post-Apartheid South Africa? (2003) 19, proceedings from a conference held 
on 14 April 2003.
6     Artz and Kunisaki op cit (n5) point, for example, to factors such as the high levels of 
mutilation and other injuries that attend rape in South Africa, as well as the prevalence of 
multiple-perpetrator and gang rapes, and forced pregnancy.
7     L Swart et al ‘Rape surveillance through district surgeons’ offi ces in Johannesburg 1996-
1998: Findings, evaluation and prevention implications’ (2000) 30(2) South African 
Journal of Psychology 1; LJ Martin Violence against Women: An Analysis of the 
Epidemiology and Patterns of Injury in Rape Homicide in Cape Town and in Rape in 
Johannesburg (1999). Rape Crisis (Cape Town) reported in 1998 that 55% of the women 
they counselled had been raped by more than one offender. Twenty-fi ve percent of these 
rapes were perpetrated by known gangs. In multiple-perpetrator rapes the number of 
offenders ranged from two to 30 in respect of any one victim. See Artz and Kunisaki op 
cit (n5).
8    Martin op cit (n7).
9     The Crime Information Analysis Centre indicates that of 52 975 rape cases reported to the 
police at a national level in 2000, only 8 297 were prosecuted, with a guilty verdict in 7.7% 
of those cases. See CIAC Monitor Analysis: Rape and Attempted Rape Statistics (2001).
       
Rape Law Reforms 169
the current reform process to include innovative reforms that can serve 
to jolt deeply entrenched institutional norms and in that way improve 
both the criminal justice response to victims and its deterrent effect on 
potential perpetrators. The focus of this article is on the role that legal 
representation for victims of sexual assault can play in this respect.
The article proceeds as follows: Part II sets out the key reforms currently 
proposed by the South African Law Commission; Part III considers evidence 
from other jurisdictions on the effectiveness of similar reforms and the 
reasons for their relative failure; Part IV introduces the concept of legal 
representation for victims of sexual assault and looks at the applicability of 
various models as a means of addressing some of the problems identifi ed 
in Part III. Part V looks at the potential utility of these models in the South 
African criminal justice system. Finally, Part VI sets out the constitutional 
and legal support for such an innovation in the South African context.
Proposed reforms to the South African law on sexual 
assault
Since 1996 the South African Law Commission has been engaged in the 
process of reforming South Africa’s laws on sexual offences. The proposed 
Sexual Offences Bill aims to revise both the substance of the common law 
on rape, as well as numerous procedural and evidentiary aspects of the 
trial process. It creates a non-gendered defi nition of rape and recognizes 
that rape may occur through penetration of objects other than the penis, 
by replacing the concept of ‘sexual intercourse’ with that of ‘sexual 
penetration’.10 Consent remains an element of the crime of ‘rape’, but is 
broadly defi ned in the Bill as meaning ‘free agreement’, excluding from 
this concept circumstances where, for example, a threat of harm has been 
made against the complainant or her property; where there has been an 
abuse of power or authority of such a nature that it inhibits resistance; 
where the victim has been led to believe that the act is something other 
than sexual penetration; and where the victim was asleep, unconscious, in 
an altered mental state, mentally disabled or below 12 years of age. 
Proposed procedural and evidentiary amendments mirror those adopted 
in other common law jurisdictions, including England and Wales, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and a number of American states. Indeed, in many 
respects these have served as a blueprint for the South African reforms. 
These reforms include the statutory abolition of the cautionary rule,11 and 
instructions that the court may not draw a negative inference from the fact 
10
   Section 2 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill [B50-2003].
11    Although some commentators consider this rule to have been abolished by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s decision in S v Jackson 1998 (1) SACR 470 (SCA), others suggest 
that the courts have continued to take a ‘cautionary approach’, which is essentially a 
       
170 SACJ    •    (2005) 2
that a previous consistent statement has not been made, or from a delay in 
reporting the alleged offence.12
From a principled perspective the reform of South Africa’s rape laws is 
important. As proposed, the Bill does away with a crime that, by defi nition, 
excludes the possibility that men may be victims and that ignores the nature 
of sexual violation as an act that bears little resemblance (whatever Posner 
or Paglia may think13) to consensual homo- or heterosexual intercourse. The 
distinction is reinforced by the inclusion in the Bill of a recognition that 
consent cannot be freely given under coercive circumstances. Evidentiary 
and procedural reforms refl ect an increased awareness of and sensitivity 
to the ways in which victims respond to rape, in respect of, for example, 
reporting patterns and rape trauma syndrome. It is, at least, a rhetorical 
move away from the institutional scepticism that marks criminal justice 
responses to rape complaints.
It is not, however, at all clear that these reforms will materially affect 
complainants’ experiences of the criminal justice process, that they will 
encourage reporting or increase convictions, or that they will serve as 
a deterrent to the currently high levels of rape in South Africa. The 
experiences of comparative jurisdictions with similar reforms suggests, 
rather, that changes will be diluted by and subsumed into existing deeply 
entrenched and profoundly masculinist criminal justice practices. The 
following section considers the evidence from these jurisdictions.
Rape law reform in comparative perspective
During the 1970s and 1980s a number of common law jurisdictions 
enacted statutes that sought to reform sexist laws relating to rape. Horney 
and Spohn14 identify four major reforms that typically occurred during this 
period: changes to the defi nition of rape; elimination of the requirement that 
       reformulation of the cautionary rule. The South African Law Commission has accordingly 
recommended that it be formally abolished. See PJ Schwikkard and SE van der Merwe 
Principles of Evidence 2ed (2002) for the former view and the South African Law 
Commission Discussion Paper 102 (Project 107) ‘Sexual Offences: Process and Procedure’ 
(2002) at para 31.2.4.10 for the latter.
12    Section 16 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill [B50-2003].
13    R Posner Sex and Reason (1992); C Paglia Vamps & Tramps: New Essays (1994). See 
also KK Baker ‘Text, context and the problem with rape’ (1999) 28 Sw U L Rev 297. 
To my mind the insistence by scholars such as these and others on equating rape with 
consensual sex gone wrong stems from a narrow obsession with coming to terms with 
date rape in America. It largely ignores the immense violence and mindless brutality that 
is associated with rape in other contexts. Marital rape is, for example, often extremely 
violent, with high incidences of weapon use and physical injuries. See P Easteal ‘Rape 
in marriage: Has the licence lapsed?’ in P Easteal (ed) Balancing the Scales: Rape, Law 
Reform and Australian Culture (1998).
14    J Horney and C Spohn ‘Rape law reform and instrumental change in six urban jurisdictions’ 
(1991) 25 Law and Society Review 117 at 118.
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there should have been resistance; elimination of the need for corroboration; 
and the enactment of rape shield laws. Finding useful indicators to measure 
the impact of these reforms is complex and diffi cult, but at least in respect 
of the aims of reducing re-victimization of the complainant during the trial, 
encouraging reporting, and decreasing attrition, it seems that ‘success’ must 
be measured in very small and relative changes. The often minor and generally 
inconclusive nature of these shifts (where they have occurred at all) have led 
a number of commentators to question the effectiveness of such reforms in 
achieving either feminist or crime-control objectives.15 For the most part there 
is agreement that laws which looked good on paper have been thwarted in 
their implementation by recalcitrant criminal justice agents and agencies.16
This problem becomes starkly apparent when one looks at the main attrition 
points in the criminal justice process: the victim’s decision to report, police 
discretion as to whether they will accept and investigate the case, prosecutorial 
discretion whether to prosecute, and the trial process itself.
  
The decision to report
If one in 20 women is reporting her rape to the police in South Africa,17
the decision to report is clearly the point at which most victims are lost to 
the system and is a cause for much concern. While the decision whether 
or not to report a rape is undoubtedly a complex and very personal one, 
studies suggest that criminal justice performance and attitudes play a 
critical role. Statistics Canada’s 1993 survey on violence against women18
reports that 50% of respondents who had not reported their assault to 
the police based this decision on a belief that the police would not be 
able to do anything. Forty-one percent cited criminal justice attitudes 
and 33% fear of retaliation by the perpetrator. In a country like South 
Africa where police performance is arguably worse than in Canada and 
patriarchal attitudes more generally tolerated, victims’ responses would no 
doubt refl ect similar concerns. Phone-in surveys in Australia suggest that 
reasons for non-reporting in that country include fear of disbelief by the 
police, fear of blame, retaliation and the court process, and uncertainty as 
to whether the assault amounted to ‘rape’ or, perhaps more importantly, 
would be defi ned as such by the criminal justice system.19
15
    C Goldberg-Ambrose ‘Unfi nished business in rape law reform’ (1992) 48 Journal of 
Social Issues 173.
16    Goldberg-Ambrose op cit (n15) 174; L Kelly Routes to Injustice (2001) passim.
17    Nicro (1993) and Rape Crisis (1996), cited in Artz and Kunisaki op cit (n5) 19.
18    Statistics Canada Violence Against Women Survey (1993), catalogue no 11-001E, Ottawa, 
Ontario.
19    J Bargen and E Fishwick Sexual Assault Law Reform: A National Perspective (1995) 
Offi ce of the Status of Women, Canberra.
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The way in which the responses of police, prosecutors and judges shape 
the construction of rape within the criminal justice system has been the 
subject of scathing critique, most notably in the form of Susan Estrich’s 
landmark book, Real Rape.20 Real rapes, according to Estrich, are those 
involving a weapon and injury, committed by strangers, outdoors. These 
are the cases that criminal justice personnel take seriously. Looking at 
the English context, Liz Kelly too speaks of a ‘real rape’ template adopted 
by criminal justice agents.21 She argues that conformity to this template 
– which informs the victim’s self-conception of the assault as a rape and 
her belief that the police will also see it that way – along with support 
from friends and family, are the strongest predictors of whether a rape 
will be reported. Women know what the system considers to be rape and 
many will choose not to risk further victimization by reporting assaults 
that may not fi t that conception. On the question of whether rape law 
reform has increased reporting levels, the research is inconclusive, with 
neither Marsh’s 1982 study22 nor Horney and Spohn’s 1991 study23 fi nding 
signifi cant changes in reporting rates, and the United States Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s 1993 study24 fi nding an increase in reporting levels, but none 
in arrests or convictions.
Police and prosecutorial discretion
Once in the system rape victims fare little better. The Crime Information 
Analysis Centre25 statistics discussed in the introduction to this article 
indicate that during 2000 between 40% to 60% of rape cases reported 
in South Africa were withdrawn by the police or prosecution. While it 
might be tempting to attribute this to the dysfunctionality of the South 
African criminal justice system, the unfortunate reality is that statistics 
from England and Wales, collected by the British Home Offi ce,26 show that 
in that jurisdiction 44% of cases reported during the study period were 
withdrawn in this way. The United States Senate Judiciary Committee 
study27 found a pre-trial dismissal rate of 48% of reported cases, although 
there were signifi cant differences noted between states. The most 
common reasons cited by police for their decision to withdraw the matter 
20
    S Estrich Real Rape: How the Legal System Victimizes Women Who Say No (1987).
21    Kelly op cit (n16) 10.
22    JC Marsh Rape and the Limits of Law Reform (1982).
23    Horney and Spohn op cit (n14).
24    Senate Judiciary Committee The Response to Rape: Detours on the Road to Equal Justice
(1993).
25    CIAC Monitor Analysis: Rape and Attempted Rape Statistics (2001).
26    J Harris and S Grace A Question of Evidence? Investigating and Prosecuting Rape in the 
1990s (1999) Home Offi ce Research Study 196.
27    Senate Judiciary Committee op cit (n24).
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is that it was a false complaint in the fi rst place28 – not surprising then that 
complainants are wary of reporting rapes – or a decision by the victim 
herself to withdraw the matter. These two reasons are not, of course, 
mutually exclusive in police minds. In a study comparing the impact of 
New Zealand’s rape law reform to fi ndings from Jennifer Temkin’s United 
Kingdom study,29 Jan Jordan found (as did Temkin) that despite the rhetoric 
of reform little has changed in police processing of rape complaints. This, 
she says, is because rape law reform is attempting to act on an ‘occupational 
culture profoundly infl uenced by traditional patriarchal thinking’.30 Jordan 
does not, however, treat the police as a monolithic institution, and is quick 
to point to the positive experiences of some respondents in her study, 
which suggests to her that individual police attitudes can be changed.31
The problem is simply that neither law reform, nor new legislation, nor 
15 years of training appears to have done the trick at an institutional level. 
As Carol Goldberg-Ambrose states, ‘[t]he goal of rape reform legislation 
that seems most diffi cult to achieve is change in knowledge, values and 
attitudes about gender and sexuality’.32 Lisa Frohmann, in an ethnographic 
study conducted over 15 months in two prosecutors’ offi ces, found these 
same attitudes and values embedded in prosecutorial assumptions about 
not only gender and sexuality, but also socio-economic status and race.33
And it is these assumptions, she suggests, that hover in the background of 
every decision whether to prosecute or drop a case.
In court
For the few who manage to run this gauntlet and make it to trial the 
troubles have just begun. Both the restrictive judicial interpretation of 
laws34 and masculinist interpretations of the facts presented in court35
have acted to undermine the goals of rape law reform. Mirroring in some 
ways Estrich’s ‘real rape’ template, Adler’s 1987 study found that despite 
substantial reforms to English rape laws (especially those governing 
character evidence), six factors consistently predicted a successful 
28
    J Gregory and S Lees Policing Sexual Assault (1999).
29    J Temkin ‘Plus ça change: Reporting rape in the 1990s’ (1997) 37 British Journal of 
Criminology 507.
30    J Jordan ‘World’s apart? Women, rape and the police reporting process’ (2001) 41 British 
Journal of Criminology 679 at 702.
31   Jordan op cit (n30) 704.
32   Goldberg-Ambrose op cit (n15) 182.
33    L Frohmann ‘Discrediting victims’ allegations of sexual assault: Prosecutorial accounts of 
case rejections’ (1990) 38 Social Problems 213.
34    Z Adler Rape on Trial (1987).
35    Horney and Spohn op cit (n14); G LaFree Rape and Criminal Justice: The Social 
Construction of Sexual Assault (1989); Temkin op cit (n29).
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prosecution: the victim’s sexual inexperience, her respectability, absence 
of consensual contact with the accused before the assault, resistance and 
injury, and early complaint.36 Where all six factors were present, she found 
a 100% conviction rate; where none occurred there were no convictions. 
Similarly, one after another American study has found rape law reform 
to have had a negligible effect on prosecution or convictions rates.37
Particularly disturbing are fi ndings from Australia, which is considered to 
have implemented some of the most progressive laws and policies relating 
to sexual offences. Although New South Wales is one of the jurisdictions 
which has done most to limit sexual history evidence and change the 
conduct of rape trials, a government-sponsored study reports that rape 
victims appearing in court were discredited as a matter of course and 
attacked during cross-examination with biased and stereotypical questions 
relating to what was considered ‘appropriate’ behaviour for them in 
relation to sex and sexual assault. Fifty-two percent of complainants were 
accused of making accusations based on vengeance or some other ulterior 
motive, and a third were accused of initiating the case solely in order to 
obtain compensation. Eighty-two percent were cross-examined about 
lying. Over half (57%) were asked about sexually provocative behaviour, 
and over a third about resistance (37%). The corroboration warning (that it 
is dangerous to convict on the uncorroborated word of a complainant in a 
rape case) was given in 40% of cases, and in only 14 of the cases sampled 
was no warning at all given to the jury in relation to the credibility of the 
witness. Having largely exhausted the limits of rape law reform, the thrust 
of most recommendations in this report is that the reforms be better 
advertised to members of the judiciary and prosecution, who should be 
trained on issues of gender bias (as well as on the content of the legislation). 
The study fi nds, however, that such ‘bias is systemic and inherent within 
the legal system… [limiting] women’s access to justice’.38
Legal representation for victims of sexual assault
The key question is how one starts to shake up these institutional norms. 
One of the ways in which entrenched norms can be jolted is through the 
36
    Adler op cit (n34).
37    See, for example, Marsh op cit (n22); S Caringella-MacDonald ‘Sexual assault prosecution: 
An examination of model rape legislation in Michigan’ (1984) 4 Women & Pol 65; K Polk 
‘Rape reform and criminal justice processing’ (1985) 31 Crime & Delinq 191; WD Loh 
‘The impact of common law and reform rape statutes on prosecution: An empirical study’ 
(1981) 55 Wash L Rev 543; R Bachman ‘Predicting the reporting of rape victimisation: 
Have rape reforms made a difference?’ (1993) 20 Crim Just & Behav 254; R Bachman and 
R Paternoster ‘A contemporary look at the effects of rape law reform: How far have we 
really come?’ (1993) 84 J Crim L & Criminology 554.
38    New South Wales Department of Women Heroines of Fortitude: The Experiences of 
Women in Court as Victims of Sexual Assault (1996) at 13.
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introduction of a person into the criminal justice process who speaks the 
language of law and can effectively represent the rights and interests of 
the victim. One of the more radical innovations mooted at various times 
by scholars concerned with the relative failure of rape law reform to 
substantially improve the position of rape victims in the criminal justice 
system, is that victims be allowed legal representation throughout or at 
specifi c points in the process.39 Because many civil law countries provide 
for victims of, especially, sexual assaults to be legally represented in some 
measure,40 it is not surprising that advocates of such reforms in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, the United States and South Africa have turned to these 
systems for models that might be usefully applied in their own countries. 
Pizzi and Peron,41 in their critique of adversarialism in the United States, and 
Pithey et al42 both draw heavily on the German Nebenkläge approach.43
Based on this model, a victim of a crime that is particularly personal in 
nature44 may join the case as an ‘ancillary prosecutor’, once the state 
has instituted proceedings against the accused.45 In this way she obtains 
the right to participate in the trial on an equal footing with the accused, 
whether personally or through a legal representative.46 She has, amongst 
others, the right to question witnesses, inspect records, request the recusal 
of a judge, and lead and object to evidence.47 Similar provision is made 
through the parte civile process in Belgium and France, a system which 
has the added advantage of joining the criminal matter with the civil issue 
of compensation.48 It comes as no surprise that stalwarts of the adversarial 
system and adversarialism in general have reacted with horror to these 
recommendations, arguing that the proposals fail to account of the many 
fundamental differences, from the role of judges to the ways in which 
evidence is collected and adduced, that differentiate the Anglo-American 
39
    Temkin op cit (n29); Bargen and Fishwick op cit (n19); WT Pizzi and W Perron ‘Crime 
victims in German courtrooms: A comparative perspective on American problems’ 
(1996) 32 Stan J Int’l L 37; WJ Murphy ‘The victim advocacy and research group: Serving 
a growing need to provide rape victims with personal legal representation to protect 
privacy rights and to fi ght gender bias in the criminal justice system’(2001) 10 Journal 
of Social Distress and the Homeless 123; I Bacik et al The Legal Process and Victims of 
Rape (1998).
40    Spain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Germany, 
France and Belgium all allow for some level of legal representation to be afforded to rape 
victims. See Bacik op cit (n39)
41    Pizzi and Perron op cit (n39).
42    B Pithey et al The Legal Aspects of Rape (1999).
43    See s 395(1) of the German Strafprozessordnung (StPO).
44    For example murder, assault, kidnapping and rape.
45    StPO s 396(1).
46    StPO s 397(1).
47    StPO s 240(2) and s 244(3)-(6).
48    Bacik et al op cit (n39) 175 and 210.
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and civil law traditions.49 At least conceptually this model also blurs the 
distinction between private prosecutions, aimed at personal vindication, 
and the principle that it is the state’s role to prosecute offenders, in the 
interests of society at large. The potential for confl icts of interest between 
these two positions is one that cannot be wished away, not least, as 
Henderson suggests, in respect of prosecutorial strategy.50
Although the civil law approach has not found general favour, the 
underlying rationale for adopting some form of representation for victims 
of sexual assaults has been more widely accepted. In this respect, at least, 
advocacy that has drawn on the civil law model has met with some success. 
Thus, for example, although the Australian Law Reform Commission51
rejected Bargen and Fishwick’s recommendation52 that legal representation 
be provided to victims throughout the rape trial process, it acknowledged 
the urgent need for some sort of intermediary in victims’ interactions with 
the system. As a result specially trained sexual assault workers have been 
introduced in various Australian states to assist victims during the trial 
process.53 The provision of support persons does not, however, address 
the fundamental imbalance that results from the construction of rape and 
the nature of the rape trial within the adversarial system. This is because 
such persons lack the ability to engage with and fundamentally change 
established patterns of interaction and institutional bias that exist within 
the criminal justice system. In this respect Henderson acknowledges that 
the ‘failure of law reform to expand the prosecution of rape’ lies not in a 
lack of rights or protection for victims, but is rather attributable to ‘law 
enforcement, prosecutors, juries and courts, (who) together with cultural 
norms, determine whether a woman is a rape victim or not’.54 It is exactly 
for the purpose of countering this institutional bias and enforcing (or at 
least contesting) the rights which are granted, in law, to rape victims that 
legal representation is so important. Given that the reservations to such an 
innovation derive in large measure from objections to their inquisitorial 
antecedents, it might be that those who recognize the need to provide a 
buffer between victims and the criminal justice system will fi nd greater 
49
    L Henderson ‘Revisiting victim’s rights’ (1999) Utah L Rev 383 at 427-30; Kelly op cit 
(n16) 37.
50    Henderson addresses this issue in the context of a broader attack on the American 
movement to have victims’ rights included in the United States Constitution. She raises, 
for example, the issue of plea-bargaining, particularly in multiple-perpetrator offences 
(her example is the Oklahoma bombing), as one where victims’ wishes may be at odds 
with prosecutorial strategy.
51    Australian Law Reform Commission Issues Paper 1 ‘Review of s 409B of the Crimes Act 
1900 (NSW)’ (1997).
52    Bargen and Fishwick op cit (n19) 103.
53    Kelly op cit (n16) 36.
54    Henderson op cit (n49) 423.
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utility in models that are grounded in the adversarial system. In this respect 
I would suggest that the Danish and Irish models are particularly useful, 
as is the emergence of a similar approach in the International Criminal 
Court.
The Danish model
Although the Danish criminal justice system contains a number of 
inquisitorial elements, it is essentially adversarial in nature. In 1980 the 
Danish legislature introduced legal representation for rape victims, 
a provision extended in 1997 to victims of other crimes.55 Legal 
representation is state-funded and lawyers are drawn from a list of those 
willing to provide such representation. The system kicks in at the time that 
a complaint is made to the police. Under the Administration of Procedure 
Act56 there is a duty on the police to inform the victim when she fi rst 
reports the rape, and before she makes a statement, that she has a right to 
legal representation. This does not preclude her from choosing to make 
a statement without such assistance. The police are under a duty to keep 
the victim informed of the investigation and, in practice, her lawyer makes 
sure that this occurs.57 Moreover, her lawyer has access to the police 
investigation and all evidence collected prior to the arrest and may discuss 
these with the victim, thus facilitating her involvement in the case. 
At trial, the victim’s lawyer may only be heard on matters directly affecting 
the victim. Thus, she may not ask for additional witnesses to be called, nor 
cross-examine the accused or any of the other witnesses. Nor may the 
victim’s lawyer make submissions to the court on points of law. She only has 
the right to be present at the trial while the victim is giving evidence. At this 
stage she may object to questions put to the victim by both the defence and 
the prosecution. She may also ask that the victim give evidence in camera
or be cross-examined without the defendant being present. At sentencing, 
the victim’s lawyer may call witnesses and lead evidence in respect of the 
impact that the crime has had on the victim and the issue of compensation, 
but may not address the court on the question of sentence. That the 
victim’s lawyer may not act as a second prosecutor is emphasized in the 
memorandum accompanying the original bill that introduced this concept. 
This means, it is suggested, that she may not concern herself with ‘questions 
of guilt, innocence or sentence’.58 Notably, Denmark has a conviction rate of 
approximately 40% of all cases reported to the police.59
55
    Administration of Procedure Act 1980 s 171. 
56    Administration of Procedure Act 1980 s 741A-E.
57    Bacik op cit (n39) 198.
58    Bacik op cit (n39) 199.
59    Bacik op cit (n39) 203. This fi gure relates to convictions as a percentage of cases reported 
during 1993-1995.
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The Irish model
Irish commentators have grappled at some length with the constitutional 
and due process implications of providing legal representation for rape 
victims within an adversarial system.60 As a compromise, rape victims 
were given the right, in 1995,61 to obtain state-funded legal advice on 
their case, a right generally considered to be of little utility in that it did 
not provide victims with assistance where they needed it: in court.62
After substantial lobbying the legislature introduced legal representation 
for complainants in cases where the defence seeks to adduce evidence 
relating to the previous sexual history of the complainant.63 Although this 
represents a far more limited intervention than that envisaged in Denmark, 
it is nonetheless an important recognition that there are times during the 
trial process when the victim must be allowed, in order to protect her 
own rights and interests, to participate in the trial as something more than 
a witness.64
The International Criminal Court
The United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power65 admonishes state 
parties that victims should be treated ‘with compassion and respect for 
their dignity’ within a responsive criminal justice system, by keeping 
victims informed of the progress and disposition of their case, allowing 
the ‘views and concerns of victims’ to be heard during proceedings, and 
providing ‘proper assistance to victims throughout the legal process’.66
Allowing the ‘views and concerns of victims to be presented and 
considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal 
interests are affected’ in a way that allows them equal and meaningful 
access to the justice process would seem to require, in most cases, that 
such representation be made through, or at least with the assistance of, 
a legal representative. It is telling, therefore, that the Rules of Procedure 
60
    A Connelly (ed) Gender and the Law in Ireland (1993); Bacik op cit (n45) 259-60.
61    Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 s 26(3).
62    Bacik op cit (n39) 258.
63    By way of s 34 of the Sex Offenders Act 2001, amending the Criminal Law (Rape)
Act 1981.
64    It also parallels, in effect, s 2907.02(F) of the Ohio Criminal Code, which provides that: 
             Upon approval by the court, the victim may be represented by counsel in any 
hearing in chambers or other proceedings to resolve the admissibility of evidence. 
If the victim is indigent or is otherwise unable to obtain the services of counsel, the 
court, upon request, may appoint counsel to represent the victim without cost to 
the victim.
65    Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 
A/RES/40/34 (1985).
66   Sections 4-6.
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and Evidence of the International Criminal Court67 allow for the victims 
of crimes tried within that forum to be legally represented and for that 
representative to participate substantially within the trial process. While 
such participation may be somewhat circumscribed by the Chamber 
(which may, for example, require that interventions be confi ned to written 
observations and submissions),68 the victim or her legal representative 
enjoys an absolute right to participate equally in arguments concerning 
the probative value and therefore the admissibility of evidence related 
to her alleged consent (through words, conduct or silence) and to her 
‘credibility, conduct or predisposition to sexual availability’.69 Such a 
legal representative is also empowered to apply to the Trial Chamber for 
the application of both protective70 and special measures71 to protect 
the victim. These include non-disclosure of the victim’s identity, use of 
electronic means to disguise the victim’s identity, provision of support 
persons and in camera hearings.
Evaluation
The presence of a legal representative for the victim potentially adds value 
at each stage of the criminal justice process, not only in protecting the 
rights and interests of the victim, but also in providing a check on the 
discretion of criminal justice personnel and therefore, at a more general 
level, promoting the integrity of the criminal justice system. The following 
section considers how legal representation for victims of sexual assault 
might work in practice and the utility it would bring to various stages of 
the criminal justice process.
Police investigations
Providing a lawyer from the time that the complaint is made to the police 
ensures, insofar as it is possible, that the complainant’s statement is 
accurately recorded and that where she is not able, because of trauma or 
fatigue or inebriation, to make a coherent statement, the recording thereof 
is deferred. This is not only a more victim-friendly approach, but has the 
distinct advantage of reducing inconsistencies between fi rst reports and 
later testimony. In South Africa, this is an acute problem, substantially 
exacerbated by the fact that police offi cers are at times only marginally 
familiar with the language in which the complainant’s report is made, and 
that complainants may be only nominally literate. In such cases the risk of 
67
   PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1.
68   Rule 91.2.
69   Rule 72.
70   Rule 87.
71   Rule 88.
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the complainant signing an inaccurate record of her report is particularly 
high, a fact that can rebound at trial, where the focus of the defence is 
often directed at seizing upon these inconsistencies. In this context, the 
presence of a victim’s lawyer at the time that a statement is taken would 
help to ensure that the victim is properly and appropriately interviewed 
and that medico-legal services are made available. Her presence may also 
serve to balance the potential vagaries of police, and later prosecutorial, 
discretion as to whether to accept a complaint in the fi rst place. 
Bail hearings
Once the perpetrator has been apprehended and the court process starts, 
the question of representation becomes even more important. The facts 
in the Carmichele case,72 where a woman was brutally attacked by a man 
who had been granted bail because the police and prosecution failed to 
notify the court that he was awaiting trial on charges of attempted rape, 
and the numerous cases recorded by Barday and Combrinck in their review 
of the application of bail legislation in rape cases,73 speak of a distinct 
disregard for victims’ rights during bail proceedings. In the Barday and 
Combrinck report women speak over and again of their shock at being 
confronted on the street by their rapist, not having been informed of his 
release on bail.74 Legal representation at this stage of proceedings would 
ensure that the fears and concerns of the victim are taken into account by 
the court, and her safety adequately protected. Again, this does not mean 
the introduction of new rights for victims, but the effective protection of 
those rights which already exist.
At trial
Rape violates the victim’s physical, psychological and sexual integrity. It is a 
uniquely personal crime that is invasive, dehumanizing and humiliating. As 
Andrea Dworkin puts it, ‘the boundary of the body itself is broken by force 
and intimidation…’.75 Despite its uniquely personal nature rape remains, 
conceptually at least, a crime against society. As such, the state arrogates 
to itself the right76 to prosecute the alleged perpetrator, in the interests of 
exacting retribution, ensuring that both the perpetrator and other potential 
offenders are deterred and, to a lesser or greater degree, facilitating the 
72
   Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).
73    R Barday and H Combrinck Implementation of Bail Legislation in Sexual Assault Cases. 
First Research Report 2000-2002 (2002)
74   Ibid
75    A Dworkin Life and Death: Unapologetic Writings on the Continuing War against 
Women (1997) 23.
76    Or more often the right of fi rst refusal. Private prosecutions may only be instituted once 
the state has declined to prosecute – see Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s 7.
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perpetrator’s rehabilitation. Compensation for victims is something that 
our bifurcated system generally leaves to the civil courts. The prosecutor 
is an offi cer of the court, with a duty to represent the state in protecting 
societal interests by assisting the presiding offi cer, who acts as ‘neutral 
umpire’, to ascertain the truth of the matter at hand. The prosecutor also 
has a responsibility, within a constitutional regime enshrining values of 
due process, to ensure that the rights of the accused are protected. This 
is manifested, for example, in the prosecutor’s duty to make available to 
the defence evidence that may prejudice the state’s case. No reciprocal or 
comparable duty rests on the defence. The prosecution does not represent 
the rape victim at trial77 and has no more responsibility to her than to any 
other witness. At times the interests of the prosecution may in fact be 
completely misaligned with the immediate personal interests of the victim 
– it may, for example, be in the interests of the prosecution for the court to 
see the victim reduced to tears as she defends her credibility under cross-
examination. Legal representatives for the accused are expected to mount 
a vigorous defence against the charges brought by the state. Inevitably 
the rape victim or witness, having recounted every intimate detail of her 
assault to the court on the instruction of the prosecutor, will come under 
a full frontal attack by the defence. It is her story that must be rebutted 
if the defendant is to walk free. To this end the defence must argue that 
either the victim was not raped at all or, if she was raped, it was not by the 
defendant or, if it was the defendant with whom she had sexual relations, 
that these were consensual. In the face of the rape victim’s testimony the 
defence strategy must therefore in most cases focus on her credibility 
as a witness. It is hardly surprising then that the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women reports as follows:
‘Indeed, in rape cases, it is the victim who is most often placed on trial rather 
than the perpetrator, accused of having ulterior motives and subjected to 
degrading questions with often pornographic overtones. Prosecutors might fail 
to adequately address the victims’ needs and all too often, information is, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, withheld from victims.’
78
In support of a defence strategy based on attacking the credibility of the 
complainant, the defence will inevitably turn to character evidence,79 most 
often in the form of allusions to previous sexual history and, more recently, 
applications for access to counselling records – what Estrich calls the ‘nuts 
77
    This is explicitly stated by the South African Law Commission in its Discussion Paper 
at para. 12.7.1 (‘the role of the prosecutor is not that of a legal representative for the 
victim’). See South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 102 (Project 107) ‘Sexual 
Offences: Process and Procedure’ (2002).
78    Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, 
Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy E/CN.4/1997/47 12 February 1997 at para 28.
79    Temkin op cit (n29).
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and sluts’ approach.80 In this respect the experience of rape victims is 
materially different from that of other victims in the system and warrants 
special treatment. Responding to arguments that this would be unjust or 
inequitable, Estrich argues that:
‘If the defenders of the system are right in saying rape cases are treated just like 
assault, and just like robbery and burglary, they are surely wrong in taking this as 
evidence of a fair and just system. The weight given to prior relationship, force 
and resistance, and corroboration effectively allows prosecutors to defi ne real 
rape so as to exclude the simple case, and then to justify that decision as neutral, 
indeed inevitable, when it is neither.’
81
It is arguably during cross-examination of the victim and during the 
defence case that she is most vulnerable and most in need of assistance 
from a person who knows the law. There is no reason, in principle, why 
the adversarial system cannot accommodate such limited representation, 
as illustrated by the Irish model. 
My preference, however, is for a more extensive model, in which the 
victim’s lawyer, as a trained legal professional can, as research suggests 
she does, complement the role of criminal justice personnel. This view 
is supported by Bacik et al’s 1998 study of rape case processing in 
various European countries. Looking at the impact of independent legal 
representation for victims the study fi nds that:
(i)   participants experienced signifi cantly fewer diffi culties in obtaining 
information about case developments;
(ii)   participants had a signifi cantly clearer understanding of their role 
at trial;
(iii)  participants reported higher levels of confi dence and articulacy 
when testifying;
(iv)   participants rated the attitude of the accused’s lawyer as signifi cantly 
less hostile;
(v)   the impact of the trial process on the participants’ families was 
considered to be signifi cantly less negative;
(vi)   participants were signifi cantly more satisfi ed with the legal process 
overall than were participants who did not have their own legal 
representative during the trial process. 82
Based on this study the researchers strongly recommended the 
introduction of victims’ lawyers in all jurisdictions (both adversarial and 
inquisitorial), a view endorsed by then United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, in her foreword to the report.83 This is 
80
   S Estrich ‘Rape shield laws aren’t foolproof’ USA Today 27 July 2003.
81   Estrich op cit (n20) 25.
82   Bacik op cit (n39) 151.
83   Bacik op cit (n39) xii.
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a recommendation that must be taken seriously if we are to move away 
from a system where the defendant’s right to ‘due process’ and a ‘fair trial’ 
in a rape case is, more often than we might like to admit, contingent on the 
victim’s incoherence, disempowerment and alienation from the criminal 
justice process. 
The South African constitutional and legal context
The South African Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to freedom 
from all forms of violence, whether from public or private sources,84 as an 
aspect of the right to freedom and security of person.85 Both the specifi c 
inclusion of a right to freedom from violence and the inclusion of ‘private’ 
violence are seen as signifi cant in extending the right to freedom and security 
of person beyond a ‘due process’ guarantee against arbitrary arrest and 
detention.86 Heléne Combrinck argues convincingly that read with s 7(2) of the 
Constitution, which requires the State to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfi l 
the rights in the Bill of Rights’, s 12(1)(c) places a positive duty on the South 
African state to act in pursuance of this right.87 This interpretation conforms 
to emerging international human rights norms, requiring state parties to 
prevent, investigate and punish violations of human rights, a principle initially 
established in the well-known case of Velasquez Rodriguez.88 Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, then United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, emphasizes this duty as follows:
‘In the context of norms recently established by the international community, 
a State that does not act against crimes of violence against women is as guilty 
as the perpetrators. States are under a positive duty to prevent, investigate and 
punish crimes associated with violence against women.’
89
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
provides a similar interpretation of state obligations under the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women90 in its 
General Recommendation 19,91 stating that:
84
   Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution.
85   Section 12(1) of the Constitution.
86    H Combrinck ‘The right to freedom from violence and the reform of sexual assault law in 
South Africa’ 184-94 in J Sarkin and W Binchy (eds) Human Rights, The Citizen and the 
State: South African and Irish Approaches (2001).
87    H Combrinck ‘Positive state duties to protect women from violence: Recent South African 
developments’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 666.
88   Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 29 July 1988, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 4 (1988) at 164-77.
89    Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
its Causes and Consequences. UN ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, (50th session, 
1994), UN DOC E/CN 4/1995/42 (1994) at 18.
90   UN DOC A/RES/34/180 (1980).
91    General Recommendation 19 (11th session, 1992). See UN DOC CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add 
15 (1992).
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‘Under general international law and specifi c human rights covenants, States 
may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to 
prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence…’
92
In terms of these international law norms, the state is liable for the 
infringement of individual rights that result both from the actions or 
omissions of the state. This requires ‘due diligence’ to prevent the violation 
occurring in the fi rst place, but also effective investigation and prosecution 
of cases where violations have occurred.93 In this respect the court in 
Velasquez Rodriguez found that:
‘Where the acts of private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously 
investigated, those parties are aided in a sense by the government, thereby 
making the State responsible on the international plane.’
94
This position has recently been endorsed by the South African 
Constitutional Court in the case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security.95
Given the extremely high levels of sexual violence in South Africa and 
the apparent reluctance of police and prosecutors to follow up on all 
but a small percentage of reported incidents, it is certainly arguable that 
the state is in breach of both the international and constitutional duties 
imposed on it to protect the rights of victims. The relative failure, in other 
jurisdictions, of the types of rape law reform proposed by the South 
African Law Commission to meaningfully shift criminal justice attitudes 
and practices suggests that these reforms will do little to change this rather 
dire picture. As long as police continue to turn away inordinate numbers of 
rape complaints, as long as prosecutors exercise their discretion in similar 
fashion, as long as rape victims continue to fear for their safety because 
rapists are being allowed out on bail with no reference to victims’ fears of 
retaliation, and as long as they experience high levels of re-victimization 
in the courtroom, the state will remain in breach of the constitutional 
imperatives created by the right to freedom from violence enshrined in
s 12(1)(c) and will not meet the standards laid down in Carmichele’s case.
That being so, it is incumbent on the state to move beyond the principled 
reforms mooted and to look to innovations that will actually improve the 
position for victims and the numerous potential victims of rape in South 
Africa.
Although I would argue that the provision of legal representation for 
rape victims does not, in any way, limit the accused’s fair trial rights, it is 
important to note that the South African courts have shown themselves 
prepared, in recent years, to limit the constitutionally protected fair 
92
   Para 9.
93   See Velasquez Rodriguez Case supra (n88) at paras 172 and 177.
94   Velasquez Rodriguez Case supra (n88) at para 177.
95   Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security supra (n72).
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trial rights of the accused when they confl ict with individual rights or 
those of the broader society by, for example, limiting the extent of the 
accused’s right to cross-examine the victim. This has occurred in two 
rape cases. In Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO,96 Melunsky J, while 
recognizing that the right to confront and cross-examine the complainant 
is an important component of the right to a fair trial, held that it was still 
necessary to balance the right of the accused with the rights of witnesses 
not to be subject to further trauma in their pursuit of justice, in this case 
by being aggressively cross-examined by an unrepresented accused. 
Similarly, in S v Cornelius97 the court found, on review, that the excessive 
length and the nature of the accused’s cross-examination of the victim in 
a rape case should have been curbed in the interests of the victim’s right 
to dignity. This balancing must surely also apply in respect of the victim’s 
constitutional right to privacy.98 The recognition that a need for such 
balancing is required will, however, remain ad hoc and the jurisprudence 
surrounding it impoverished until such time as opportunity is made for 
rape victims’ rights to be properly represented, disputed and adjudicated.
Conclusion
This article has taken the position that the reforms proposed by the South 
African Law Commission to amend the laws on sexual assault are largely 
inadequate and insuffi cient to deal with the enormity of the problems 
posed by both the nature and extent of rape in this country and problematic 
criminal justice responses. The evidence from comparative jurisdictions 
supports this proposition, by illustrating the often minor effects of similar 
reforms in those jurisdictions over the past 30 years. Much of this failure 
can be attributed to recalcitrant attitudes of criminal justice personnel and 
deeply entrenched masculinist norms within criminal justice institutions. 
It is argued that, in the face of this evidence and in light of the international 
human rights and constitutional responsibilities placed on the South 
African state to prevent, investigate and punish violations of the right to be 
free from all forms of violence, whether emanating from public or private 
sources, the state must look to innovative reforms that can meaningfully 
96
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97   S v Cornelius 1999 JDR 0145 (C).
98    Section 14 of the Constitution. The constitutional privacy arguments applied to applications 
for disclosure of victims’ counselling records in Massachusetts provide an important 
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shift criminal justice attitudes and address institutional biases towards 
victims of sexual assault. One way in which this can be done is by providing 
legal representation for victims of sexual assault, along the lines of the 
Danish and Irish models described in this paper. While the Danish model 
is perhaps the ideal, in that it provides protection for the victim from the 
time that the rape is reported, adoption of the more limited Irish model 
would still represent an important recognition of the victim’s dignity and 
privacy rights and her interest in protecting these rights during the trial 
process. Without innovative interventions into prevailing practices, it is 
argued, the treatment of sexual assault in the criminal justice system will 
continue to rely on and reproduce arcane notions of acceptable feminine 
behaviour and masculinist myths about who is and who is not a deserving 
victim.
       
